The political dimension of dance : Mouffe’s theory of agonism and choreography by Petrović, Goran
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/134039                 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk.
 1 
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF DANCE:  
MOUFFE’S THEORY OF AGONISM AND CHOREOGRAPHY 
 
Goran Petrović Lotina 
 
 
This chapter explores the political dimension of contemporary dance, focusing on the concept 
of agonism as it is conceived by the political theorist Chantal Mouffe. Contrary to other models 
of agonism, Mouffe’s work is constructed around a definition of agonism that implies a certain 
degree of antagonism that can never be eliminated. This view explains that agonism (a we/they 
relation in which the two sides are adversaries) is always threatened by antagonism (a we/they 
relation in which the two sides are enemies). Given that ‘the task of democracy is to transform 
antagonism into agonism’,1 I will argue that Mouffe’s agonistic model of democratic politics 
enables the possibility of understanding how art, and dance in particular, is able to contest and 
transform the dominant neo-liberal politics—their hegemonised institutions, sedimented social 
practices, and determined representations which mobilise antagonistic relations. Specifically, 
once we have acknowledged that antagonism is inherent to every social construction, we can 
begin to understand how the articulatory power of dance is manifested within the context of 
counterhegemonic struggle. I argue that it is precisely in the engagement with political struggle 
between complying forces (those that support hegemonic order) and contesting forces (those 
that counter dominant hegemony), that the dynamic, transformative and creative power of 
dance is disclosed. 
 
In order to support this argument, I will first turn to the quasitranscendental philosophical 
trajectory developed by the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, before then turning to 
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examine post-foundational politico-philosophical thought, which emphasises the indispensable 
moment of exclusion in the construction of any social practice, and the dimension of the 
impossibility of absolute foundation or grounding. This is of particular relevance to Mouffe’s 
agonistic model of democratic politics which proposes the disarticulation and transformation 
of dominant socio-political discourses around we/they relations. For Mouffe, democratic 
politics begins by acknowledging—rather than suppressing—antagonistic relations within the 
practice of hegemony. Insight into Mouffe’s political theory provides the basis for grasping the 
political dimension of art and, moreover, will permit an understanding of it in terms of 
counterhegemonic struggle. In the final section, I envisage dance practice from these 
philosophical and political standpoints with the aim of defining choreography in relation to the 
sphere of contestation such that it may be understood to contribute to the transformation of 
democracy and society as a whole. In this regard, what I will be calling agonistic encounters 
and agonistic objectifications in dance performances will be the articulation of partial and 
contesting systems of relations allowing different realities to be materialised in the same space. 
 
 
THE POSTFOUNDATIONAL TURN: 
MOUFFE AND THE RADICALISATION OF DEMOCRACY  
 
One can distinguish, broadly, two distinct trajectories within contemporary continental 
philosophical thought. On the one hand, there is the quasitranscendental trajectory developed 
in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida, who has influenced the post-foundational politico-
philosophical thought of thinkers such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe; and on the other 
hand, there are those thinkers influenced by Baruch Spinoza’s and Gilles Deleuze’s ontological 
trajectory of immanence (Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno and Roberto Esposito, 
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among others). Where these trajectories diverge is in terms of their respective relations to 
metaphysics, specifically over the question of existence and the nature of existence itself. For 
Deleuze, the task of philosophy is to construct metaphysics—which renders what he terms the 
‘pure plane of immanence’, envisaged as the existence of a smooth space without constitutive 
division. For Derrida, by contrast, the task of philosophy is to overcome metaphysics—which 
renders the horizon of transcendence, a movement of the ‘outside’ that striates the smooth 
space. Deleuze’s concept of immanence suggests that the construction of differences is possible 
but restricts them exclusively to the dimension of metaphysics. Derrida—who like Deleuze, 
knows that there is no outside to metaphysics—understands metaphysics as a structural closure, 
such that the project of overcoming it is impossible. Nevertheless, for Derrida, as Daniel Smith 
has pointed out, it is exactly ‘this very impossibility that conditions the possibility of 
deconstructing the philosophical tradition from within’.2 Pointing to the aporetic and 
constitutive relation of the categories of possible and impossible, or immanence and 
transcendence, this theoretical approach renders Derrida’s philosophical trajectory quasi-
transcendental.3 
 
A closer look at the relation between the trajectories of immanence and quasi-transcendence 
shows that these different approaches to metaphysics result from two different ways of defining 
difference. For Deleuze difference refers to the difference between being and beings and 
difference of being in itself [l’Être avec soi dans la différence].4 Hence, in Deleuze, difference 
is always part of metaphysics. His approach explains that the reactivation of virtualities and 
creation are possible only within metaphysics and that these operations are capable of 
transforming metaphysics anew. Thus, for Deleuze ‘difference must be articulation and 
connection in itself… a differenciation of difference’ and not representation.5 The ‘in-itself 
difference’ is situated in becoming, in ‘a life’, out of which subjects and objects are actualised. 
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Given these points, difference is contained within the plane of absolute immanence that is more 
real than reality—hence ‘virtuality’: a disembodied abstraction, an Enlightenment polity of 
laws independent of the state of affairs and thus of meaning and representation. By contrast, 
Derrida considers difference as something that is always excluded from metaphysics, 
something which is not part of it, and so constantly disrupts and destabilises metaphysics from 
the outside. As such, difference may never be conceptually grasped in its totality but only 
precariously represented through a performative and discursive operation. Thus, for Derrida—
what he terms—différence is a relation that transcends metaphysics and the ontological 
difference between Being and beings.6 This exterior to the metaphysical tradition, which 
constantly threatens the closure of metaphysics, conditions its very possibility and thus makes 
‘exteriority’ a quasi-transcendental and constitutive part of metaphysics itself.7  
 
The quasi-transcendental insistence on exteriority leads post- foundational thinkers—such as 
Laclau and Mouffe—to call for the de- essentialisation of the classical metaphysical figures of 
foundation such as ground, universality and totality, and not their recuperation on immanent 
grounds. They stress the need not to withdraw from these figures, but to engage with them in 
order to continuously contest and weaken their ontological status from within. The political 
implications of such an approach become clear once we see that this way of addressing the 
problem and nature of existence compels us to acknowledge that every social construction is 
precarious and contingent. Oliver Marchart has described post- foundationalism as thus resting 
on an undecidable terrain, in the eternal tension between ground and abyss, between attempts 
at foundation and the inevitable failure of such efforts.8 Following Marchart’s thought, we may 
say that the frontier between these differential arrangements, between ground and abyss, may 
never be overcome—only expanded at the expense of another choice. It is this unavoidable 
tension between differential positions that acknowledges paradox as constitutive of any social 
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construction. In sustaining paradoxical tensions, post-foundationalism recognises hegemony 
and antagonism as inherent to society. It shows that every identity, object and relation may 
always be otherwise. Thus, post-foundationalism strives to challenge the homogenising and 
totalising conceptualisations of ontological paradigms that seek to sustain the social and 
political status quo. 
 
This argument is particularly important to the development of post-Marxist political theory. In 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s critique of essentialism, liberal 
theories of rationalism and individualism, evolved from a theory of discourse analysis. 
Deepening Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘discursive formation’, they defined discourse, not 
only as a combination of speech and writing, but as a system of linguistic and extralinguistic 
relations.9 This is to say that every social configuration is meaningful and only discursively 
constructed within a system of differences. Thus, distinguishing ‘discourse as a system of 
differential entities’ from ‘the field of discursivity’, discourse becomes an ensemble of 
differential entities materialised through a language game—consisting not only of language, 
but also, as Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests, of the actions with which language is entwined.10 
Such language games relate one entity to another and strive to achieve totality and domination 
over the ‘field of discursivity’. However, Laclau and Mouffe cancel the completeness of the 
relational logic of these entities by affirming that ‘a discursive totality never exists in the form 
of a simply given and delimited positivity’.11 On the contrary, the discursive totality can ‘exist 
[only] as a partial limitation of a “surplus of meaning”’.12 From this, we should understand 
that the various entities that form the field of discursivity, may threaten a discursive totality. 
This means that no single principle, no determination in the last instance for defining society—
for example, the role played by class in Antonio Gramsci or the logic of reproduction in Louis 
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Althusser—may fix the whole field of differential entities. Each fixation of totality can only 
ever be an unstable and partial limitation of conflicting entities.13 
 
Thus, every social construction becomes a reflection of a partial limitation in relation to that 
which exceeds the discursive configuration. The production of limits demonstrates that all 
social constructions are organised by the same principle of exclusion. For example, the 
identities ‘poor’, ‘gay’ or ‘immigrant’ become symbolically subordinated and excluded in 
relation to different discourses depending on whether they are discourses that prioritise class 
over gender or gender over race, and so on. And it is by means of revealing the differences that 
permeate social practices that an excluded social group struggles to rearticulate the very terms 
of symbolic legitimacy by threatening and destabilising the dominant social order and its 
limits—stimulating ruptures within the social fabric of totality. As Laclau and Mouffe explain, 
the relational logic between these differential positions, between the symbolic order and its 
surplus, between interiority and exteriority, implies not only conflict but also the redrawing of 
limits between conflicting positions. When limits expand, they do so to the detriment of other 
possible symbolisations, but they are never able to entirely overcome each other. It is for this 
reason that Mouffe’s and Laclau’s discourse approach to the construction of the social implies 
a politics that, by drawing limits, acknowledges antagonism and hegemony to be inherent to 
society. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe distinguished hegemony and antagonism as key concepts in defining the 
nature of the political: ‘One can see hegemony as a theory of the decision, taken in an 
undecidable terrain.’14 Informed by the dimension of radical negativity, hegemony manifests 
itself in the possibility of excluding other choices and, thus, acknowledges the ever-present 
possibility of antagonism between paradoxically differential positions: ‘Antagonisms are not 
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objective relations, but relations which reveal the limits of all objectivity. Society is constructed 
around these limits, and they are antagonistic limits.’15 With respect to antagonism, every 
social order or ‘objectivity’ is pragmatic and contingent construction. Drawing upon Carl 
Schmitt, Mouffe acknowledges the ever-present possibility of antagonism within the social 
realm and formulates her agonistic model of democratic politics. Agonistic democracy implies 
a politics that allows for a choice between conflicting relations, between paradoxically different 
logics while criticising rationalist and individualist politics of consensus, totality, and harmony, 
which aim to do away with conflicts and, by doing so, propel antagonistic relations. Insofar as 
the conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’ may never be rationally overcome, the crucial question of 
Mouffe’s democratic politics is: how to organise human relations in a way that is adequate to 
the plurality of positions that constitute the social realm? How to transform and articulate the 
antagonistic relations that exist between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in an agonistic configuration? These 
questions imply, by extension, the need for the radicalisation of democracy. According to 
Mouffe, to radicalise democracy is to offer a critique of the dominant discourses of liberalism 
that are characterised by individualism and rationalism. In The Democratic Paradox, she 
explains that the aim is to challenge the hegemony of the liberal tradition of equality— which 
stands for the rule of law, the defence of human rights and respect for individual liberty, to the 
detriment of the democratic tradition of equality—which stands for the recognition of we/they 
distinctions and popular sovereignty.16 Within the liberal tradition, she distinguishes two 
paradigms: the instrumental rationality of the so-called ‘aggregative’ model of liberal 
democracy—which is moved by economic interests and the communicative rationality of the 
‘deliberative’ model of liberal democracy— which is defined by morality.  
 
These two liberal politico- philosophical regimes are constituted on an a priori ability to discern 
the excluded, the other, which is designated by ‘they’, as the enemy, whose ‘constitutive’ role, 
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in order to be recognised, has to be subsumed to the universal economic or moral laws they 
have already prescribed. Both models, therefore, endeavour to establish a homogeneous, 
univocal and non- conflictual society, by achieving a consensus on the existence of universal 
economic regulations or human rights (as natural regulations and rights to be respected). 
However, by recognising and subordinating the other as the enemy (as a threat to universal 
economic principles and human rights) modern liberal democracy entails destructive, 
antagonistic contradictions, precisely by leaving ‘no choice’ to the people. What is necessary, 
in order to reverse the antagonistic effects of liberalism, according to Mouffe, is to reinstitute 
the democratic conception of equality and the political constitution of a ‘demos’, and to 
rearticulate relations between democracy and liberalism. 
 
Mouffe explains that the relation between these two political traditions may be rearticulated by 
the acknowledgement of radical negativity at the level of the ontological. This demands a 
recognition that conflict and struggle are ineradicable from the society. Therefore, the goal is 
not to overcome conflictual we/they relations, but to construct them in different ways. 
According to Mouffe, such an ontological approach enables a reconfiguration of antagonistic 
social relations (struggle between enemies) in agonistic discourse (struggle between 
adversaries). For sure, adversaries fight against each other over the interpretation of their 
principles in hegemonic terms, ‘but they do not put into question the legitimacy of their 
opponent’s right to fight for the victory of their position’.17 In other words, the opponent’s 
right is not to be subjugated and subsumed to universal economic interests or moral laws; 
disparate demands should rather be confronted and debated. It is precisely the 
acknowledgement of the confrontation between adversarial positions—which mobilises 
passions and affects among people and provides active citizenship—that distinguishes 
‘agonistic pluralism’ from the aggregative and deliberative approaches in democratic political 
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theory. Agonistic pluralism points at the agonistic articulation of the struggle between 
paradoxically different positions through democratic institutions. To clarify this new 
perspective Mouffe makes an important conceptual distinction between politics and the 
political. In On the Political she writes: 
 
by ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human 
societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions through which an order 
is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.18 
 
Borrowing Heidegger’s vocabulary, Mouffe explains ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ in ontic-
ontological terms. The ontological concerns ‘the very way in which society is instituted’, 
whereas the ontic level has to do with the ‘manifold practices of conventional politics’.19 By 
situating antagonism at the level of the ontological, then, Mouffe identifies the space of 
counter-hegemonic struggle as being made possible by the dimension of the political. This 
view acknowledges that antagonism is inherent to society, that it presents an ever-present 
possibility, and that it cannot be eradicated. As such, antagonism conditions the possibility of 
a domestication of conflicts within the field of politics in agonistic configuration. The 
constitution of society in agonistic terms does not simply render a concrete resolution for a 
conflict which originates at the ontological level. Rather, agonism is a proximate solution to 
conflict and is always threatened by antagonism. As such, agonism, which situates politics at 
the level of the ontic, is a precarious and contingent practice. This explains why society can 
never be established as fixed totality, but only as a temporary constructed order of human 
collectives whose conditions of existence are always to be threatened by conflicting forces. 
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Recognising this existential condition, Mouffe’s agonistic approach to politics provides both a 
theoretically dynamic model of social relations and a practical radicalisation of democracy. 
 
In concluding this section on Mouffe’s theory of agonism, it is necessary to emphasise that 
moments of decision play an important role for the agonistic model of democratic politics. This 
indicates that the antagonistic confrontation between conflicting alternatives of the liberal-
democratic values and we/they relations entails decisions that require making a choice beyond 
moral categories of good and bad. Mouffe explains that ‘a decision in favor of some alternative 
is always at the detriment of another one’, thus situating undecidability at the core of politics.20 
‘Undecidability which is at work in the construction of any form of objectivity’, acknowledges 
that the conflict between different choices cannot be bypassed, and prevents any form of 
essentialisation and totality.21 It is precisely undecidability—the impossibility of deciding 
between paradoxical choices, thus pointing to the contingent character of decisional acts—that 
distinguishes Mouffe’s project of democracy from other theorists identified with agonism.22 
Within Mouffe’s theoretical approach to agonism, hegemonic forces and antagonistic relations 
are ineradicable from society. 
 
 
ART AND AGONISM: AGONISTIC OBJECTIFICATIONS  
 
The agonistic model of democratic politics recognises inextricable relations between art and 
politics. Contrary to liberalism, which considers the relation between art and politics in 
clearly delimited, unchallenged spheres, confined within an immanent and univocal field, an 
agonistic model of democratic politics introduces the ontological dimension of ‘the political’ 
which offers another perspective on their relation. Accordingly, in Agonistics, Mouffe writes: 
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I do not see the relation between art and politics in terms of two separately constituted fields, 
art on one side and politics on the other, between which a relation would need to be 
established. There is an aesthetic dimension in the political and there is a political dimension 
in art. This is why I consider that it is not useful to make a distinction between political and 
non-political art. From the point of view of the theory of hegemony, artistic practices play a 
role in the constitution and maintenance of a given symbolic order, or in its challenging, and 
this is why they necessarily have a political dimension.23 
 
For Mouffe, the main consequence of the agonistic model of democratic politics for artistic 
practices lies in their political dimension, manifested in the way they can either support or 
challenge the symbolic order underpinning social relations. The operation of challenging the 
symbolic order entails a struggle and contest against the discourses appropriated by the 
dominant politics of liberalism. It is, then, with regard to the struggle for the symbolisation of 
different social relations, which may invigorate democracy, that we can distinguish the 
contesting dimension of artistic practices from those whose role is merely one of compliance. 
And, it is with this distinction that the importance of hegemony and antagonism emerges for 
understanding the political dimension of artistic practices: it helps us to recognise the pragmatic 
role of art and the consequences it may produce. Only when the consequences of art are 
analysed are we able to see that artistic practices are capable of either sustaining or challenging 
and (dis)articulating dominant politics, sedimented social practices and fixed representations 
embedded in liberal universal categories. 
 
To grasp this point more fully, I would like to take a closer look at the connections between art 
and discourse, insofar as it provides the two key concepts for defining art in relation to the 
 12 
political—the concepts of antagonism and hegemony. To say that every artistic practice is 
produced by means of symbolisation is to acknowledge that objects of art—just like different 
collectives, cultures and identities—are discursively constructed. This operation demands an 
understanding of discourse not as a mere representation of the social or the historical that 
encompasses only practices of speaking, writing and communicating, but as something 
constitutive of the social and of histories that encompasses all dimensions of social reality. In 
other words, discourse does not reflect the mentality of rationalising the ‘being’ of an object at 
the level of universal conceptual form (this would be idealism or realism); it rather reflects the 
material character of every social construction and that the very being of objects is itself a 
discursive production—not an ‘essence’. The question that arises out of the discursive 
approach to the understanding of objects will then be—not what the objects of art are—but 
rather how they are constructed as well as what are the consequences of structuring the objects 
of art as such? 
 
This way of approaching the problem of the object demands the abandonment of the 
thought/reality dualism which reduces and rationalises the real of the object—that is, its 
existence—to the level of either abstract or concrete universal category. Hence, to stress the 
inconsistency of any rationalist conception of ‘objective totality’, Laclau and Mouffe introduce 
the idea of ‘relational totality’ that affirms the material character of every discursive 
structure.24 Deepening both Marx’s materialism which showed that the meaning of any object 
is a result of radical exchange and relationalism of things and Wittgenstein’s concept of the 
language-game ‘consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven’,25 Laclau and 
Mouffe define a discursive configuration in terms of relational sequences between linguistic 
phenomena and institutions, social practices, and rituals, through which discourse is 
structured.26 Hence, discourse is a system of social relations within which objects are 
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symbolically constituted. To move away from rationalism is, then, to point out the material 
properties of every object, that is, to show the relational, historical, contingent and constructed 
character of the being of objects. 
 
In recognising that the object acquires the attribute of materiality we are then able to 
acknowledge that an everyday object is understood as an object of art only when it is situated 
in a system of relations that structures and articulates it within the social practice of art. For 
example, a stone is an object of art only to the extent that it establishes a system of relations 
with the institution of art; otherwise, when we throw it, the stone is a projectile used in a game. 
This example shows that the meaning of the object depends on the context of its actual ‘use’ 
which situates it within a system of relations comprised of differential entities, articulating it 
in a particular totality. Provided that the meaning of the object is constructed within a particular 
context, that is, a particular system of relations—society is never able to fix or fully articulate 
the variety of possible positions of the object under the logic of a single principle. A discursive 
configuration reveals, in other words, that the meaning of the object lies in the performative 
operation that articulates relations between differential entities within a particular delimited 
context. In regard to articulation, the meaning of an object is no longer separated as a 
conceptually discrete element or as empirically given. On the contrary, the meaning of every 
object is a consequence of the articulatory practice; it is constructed in relational sequences, 
denying any sort of absolutely fixed meaning. Relational totality then is the property of 
associated entities; it entails the process of discursive configuration which partially fixes the 




For this reason, hegemony, which manifests itself precisely in the moment of decision, implies 
that the meaning of the object is conditioned by the range of discourses that a particular 
relational configuration excludes. Accordingly, every work of art, just as every object, is 
constructed by the limits established between differential positions—between interiority and 
exteriority of the object, or between its totality and its surplus—which prevent its full 
foundation or absolute objectivity. Once it is recognised that the production of limits cancels 
the existence of objective relations, we have to acknowledge that the construction of the object 
of art is an effect of unstable and paradoxical relations between differential entities that may 
never be overcome. It is, then, with regard to the moments of decision and exclusion that all 
limits to objectivity are paradoxical and a manifestation of antagonism. On the one hand, this 
view explains why different societies are incapable of fully articulating and fixing the being of 
objects; on the other hand, it shows that the stability of the object may always be threatened by 
its constitutive exterior. For instance, the system of fixed relations among differential entities 
reflects the way institutions, such as museums, art galleries, theatres, art funds, and even artists 
themselves, seek to fasten the being of an object through the work of art in a particular 
representation and thereby delimit its reality. Conversely, recourse to the object’s exteriority 
makes it possible to challenge established limits by showing the relational, historical, 
contingent, constructed and repetitive character of those actions by which cultural institutions 
have determined the ‘being’ of objects through the work of art. This view explains that every 
institution or social practice, just like every object of art, is a precarious and contingent 
construction threatened by its constitutive outside. 
 
At this point, I would like to envisage the system of differential entities that fixes, or stabilises, 
the meaning of the object and the range of its excluded positions in terms of Mouffe’s 
distinction between politics and the political. Viewed in this manner, politics would define the 
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institutional and hegemonic position of the object of art which is articulated within a particular 
system of social relations, while the range of the object of art’s excluded positions is to be 
understood in terms of the political. Once we envisage art in this way, we are allowed to say 
that art may belong to the realm of politics—to the hegemonic set of practices and institutions 
that attempt to determine the reality of objects; and, on the other hand, that art may belong to 
the realm of the political—that it may possess the dimension of antagonism and thus become 
able to challenge and disarticulate the realm of politics. This assertion invokes the idea that art 
and politics are always enmeshed; that art always possesses a political dimension. And, while 
some art discloses the political dimension by complying with existing politics, another art 
discloses the political dimension by contesting them. For instance, in contrast to—what might 
be called—complying artistic practices which reproduce the power of politics by virtue of what 
Franco Farinelli calls ‘geometrical objectification’—the objectification which reduces the 
observer’s gaze to a ‘vanishing point’ and, thus, smooths divergences between subject and 
object27—contesting artistic practices challenge the consistency established between subject 
and object by striating the space they share through the intervention of outside stimuli. In other 
words, complying artistic practices support forms of absolute objectification which unites all 
differences under the logic of unmitigated totalities, such as quantitative or spatial images of 
the world. In contrast, contesting artistic practices disclose and produce dialectics of, what I 
call, agonistic objectification which arises from the impossibility of any full constitution of 
totalities and which requires qualitative properties of the social that mobilise intelligence, 
imagination and active participation in instituting the world. If absolute objectification, then, 
seeks to contain art within hegemonic institutions and the set of practices, representations and 
rules that they prescribe, agonistic objectification seeks to challenge them and define art with 
regard to its qualitative character—as the contingent and pragmatic configuration of artistic 
articulations that determine objects of art within a particular relational and temporal context. 
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Once we acknowledge the constitutive relation between absolute and agonistic objectifications, 
we are able to recognise that contesting artistic practices may challenge relations that are 
sedimented and objectified by repetition in a fixed and absolute totality. According to this 
distinction, it follows that art, embraced at the level of the ontic, is identified with hegemonic 
politics and the forces of compliance, while, seen at the level of the ontological, it reveals its 
contesting and antagonistic dimension placing itself within the context of counter hegemonic 
practices and struggle. 
 
Important to realise is that through processes of repetition any counterhegemonic or critical 
gesture may itself become sedimented, fixed and instrumentalised by hegemonic politics. As 
Yannis Stavrakakis points out ‘something that starts as a non-conformist radical intervention 
often ends up being gradually absorbed by the art system and the dominant hegemonic order, 
partially transforming its status at the same time’.28 This is why art within the context of 
counter-hegemony should be seen as a continuous contest and struggle against discourses 
appropriated and manipulated by the hegemonic politics, and the social practices and forms of 
representation they have fixed. Against a politics that govern affects and passions, counter-
hegemonic and contesting artistic practices provide a terrain for resistance to this operation and 
thus for the production of new collectives. According to this view, the relation between art and 
politics does not conceive of the artist as an apolitical solipsist, but as an active participant in 
the struggle against dominant hegemonic politics which imply antagonistic relations. The role 
of the artist is, thus, to plunge into objects we are all observing, in order to expose antagonistic 
relations as being inherent to the construction of any objectivity and to widen a horizon for the 
articulation of those relations in an agonistic configuration. In this context, the artist is someone 
who is always occupied with connections between discourses that structure objects in the 




AGONISTIC DANCE PRACTICES  
 
I have argued that in order to grasp the political dimension of any artistic practice, it is 
necessary to introduce a discursive approach to the analysis of art. I suggested that this can be 
achieved by pursuing insights found in Mouffe’s agonistic model of democratic politics which 
emphasises discursive configuration, antagonism and hegemony to be constitutive of any social 
construction. Mouffe has demonstrated that reality is discursively constructed as a system of 
linguistic and extralinguistic relations which entail the construction of antagonistic limits and 
moments of exclusion. As we have seen, the place of the excluded is situated at the level of the 
ontological, from which it challenges the stability of hegemonic politics—institutions, social 
practices and representations. I therefore suggested that art may comply with politics—insofar 
as it supports hegemonic institutions and sets of practices and representations that those 
institutions prescribe; and that art may contest politics—insofar as it challenges existing 
politics through the form of a counter-hegemonic struggle which reveals antagonism to be 
inherent to any objectification. The way of approaching art in terms of constitutive relations 
between differential positions—between complying and contesting artistic practices— 
provides the framework for the argument that I want to advance in this final section, about the 
relation between dance and politics as well as the political dimension of dance practices. In 
order to embrace the two key concepts for defining the political—hegemony and antagonism—
I will, now, turn attention to the construction of discourses in relation to dance practice. 
 
To show how dance constructs diverse and compelling communities, the dance scholar, Judith 
Hamera, observes that dance is always produced in relation to discourse: ‘all performance, 
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including dance, is enmeshed with language, in reading, writing, rhetoric, and in voice’.29 We 
can agree with Hamera that steps and positions have names, that movements always tell stories 
and are taught through stories, and that metaphor may be used to communicate how a 
movement looks or feels.30 We can also agree with her that press kits and reviews are part of 
dance performance; they communicate ideas and help dance companies to survive.31 Here, 
names, stories, metaphors and reviews acknowledge the mental capacity of spectators to 
rationalise the object of art at the level of the concept. However, such a view reduces discourse 
to a mere presentation of dance as a social practice of choreographing bodily movements 
without questioning the nature of that social practice itself. In order to grasp the political 
dimension of all performance, including dance, it is necessary to conceive of discourse in terms 
of relations that encompass all dimensions of social reality. In such a context, discourse stands 
not only for the practices of naming, writing and speaking, that is, of presenting the elements 
of dance as an aesthetic practice; it also stands for the system of relations materialised through 
language games, through body language and actions with which body language is entwined, 
that is, representing the moments of dance. Representation implies that the body is entangled 
with various social practices, activities and initiatives in a particular chain—a wide network of 
relations between different actors who share an interest in bringing to recognition particular 
demands. In short, while the practice of presenting stands for the conceptual totality of the 
object’s becoming, the practice of representing stands for the being of objects situated within 
the system of relations that renders relational totality. And, inasmuch as the operation of 
representation, as we shall soon see, invokes antagonism and hegemony propelled by the 
principle of exclusion, it instantly enables the understanding of how dance may sustain 
existing, or construct different communities. 
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Now, the material properties of every social construction involved in the performative 
operation articulate a particular discursive relation between different objects or a different 
range of movements. On this basis, le demi-plié or an act of everyday movement is understood 
as dance only when it is situated in the system of relations that structures and articulates it as a 
social practice of dance.32 In a similar way, acrobatics, military marching, sports and games, 
were perceived as dance only at the time Yvonne Rainer embodied them in her choreography. 
Likewise, a series of quotidian gestures such as leaning head on hand, running fingers through 
hair, baring and covering shoulders, among others, were utilised and connected in the system 
of mechanical movements in Rosas Danst Rosas (1983) choreographed by Anne Teresa De 
Keersmaeker.33 As these examples show, dance takes form within the context of the actual 
‘use’ of the movement which it situates into a particular system of relations and articulates, or 
rather, embodies in choreography. Understood in this way, choreography is a decisive symbolic 
ordering of bodies, which fixes a temporal performative movement in space. Being structured 
through the act of decision that organises the range of physical movements within the context 
of existing politics, social practices, dance techniques and representations—which it either 
supports or challenges—choreography is, therefore, a manifestation of hegemony. Whether it 
complies with existing politics or contests them, from the point of view of the theory of 
hegemony, dance nevertheless possesses a political dimension. Andrew Hewitt’s assertion that 
choreography is ‘a way of thinking about the relationship between aesthetics to politics’ is 
perfectly justified; as is his claim that choreography cannot be ‘set in the opposition to the 
category of “the political”’.34 
 
Hewitt’s suggestion that choreography may be thought in relation to politics provides a 
framework for the argument that I want to make about the political dimension of dance within 
the context of counter-hegemonic struggles. To say that choreography fixes or stabilises a 
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temporal performative movement in space, is to define choreography as a hegemonic system 
of differential corporeal movements, distinct from the range of physical moves that it excludes. 
For instance, the rigid ballet technique which maintains physical mastery over dancing bodies 
by means of strict methods (alignment, turnout, posture, toe pointing, and so on) is grounded 
in the exclusion of everyday movement from choreography. In a similar way, the still-act in 
the dance performances of Steve Paxton in the 1970s, and Vera Mantero and Jerome Bel in the 
1990s, rests on the exclusion of uninterrupted and abstract movements of ballet and modern 
dance from choreography.35 As these examples show, choreography may be embodied in a 
stable representation only in relation to the surplus movements that it excludes. And, insofar 
as they are constitutive for choreography, the excluded physical moves may always disrupt the 
system of differential corporeal movements which strive to subsume them and, under the 
principle of repetition, achieve domination over them. 
 
The disrupting potential of the range of physical moves that are excluded is manifested in the 
mobilisation of the variety of impromptu acts inclined to destabilise and disarticulate 
constructed, historical and contingent systems of differential corporeal movements sedimented 
in a choreographic representation by means of dance techniques. By impromptu bodily acts I 
mean the embodiment of any corporeal movement in choreography that occurs as a result of 
the struggle of the bodies involved in the recognition of particular demands that have been 
excluded by hegemonic politics, or have been symbolically subordinated to different discourses 
that, for example, prioritise religion over gender, gender over class, or class over ethnicity, and 
so on. Under these circumstances, the counterhegemonic choreographed movement is the 
embodiment of any corporeal movement that mobilises passions, triggered by acts of resistance 
against various universal social, economic or moral laws that entail antagonistic and destructive 
relations. This form of bodily movement may be associated, for instance, with the 
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choreography of Arkadi Zaides. In Archive (2014), Zaides performs by extracting a range of 
physical moves and vocal gestures from the video recordings taken by Palestinians to document 
acts of violation of their rights under the Israeli occupation. Embodied in choreography, the 
physical actions (pointing a gun, throwing a stone, scattering sheep or shattering olive trees) 
and accompanying vocal cues (shouts, taunts or jeers) that Israeli soldiers resort to, in various 
situations of deterring Palestinians, mobilise passions that, as ‘affective forces’, provide the 
public with the possibility to identify with the absent or excluded body of the oppressed and to 
mobilise energy for action.36 By challenging the opposition between viewing and acting, this 
kind of collective identification renders what Jacques Rancière calls the emancipated spectator. 
The significance of this practice lies in introducing bodily choreographic movements of 
aggression and resistance as conflictual representations that point to the exclusion and 
antagonism inherent in that society—and hence to the need for the transformation and 
redistribution of the existing positions within it.  
 
By turning our attention to compelling social, political and economic predicaments, such as 
ongoing conflicts, anti-migratory policies, climate warming, the downfall of the welfare state 
and the growing threat of international terrorism—all of which are in fact the antagonistic and 
destructive consequences of the neoliberal politics of globalisation—dance may open up the 
space for the articulation of politics that aim at constructing different communities. This way 
of approaching the public enables contemporary dance to mobilise qualitative properties of the 
social—intelligence, imagination and active participation.37 This operation provides the 
horizon for the disarticulation and transformation of antagonistic limits between different 
forces—between those that comply with dominant politics by means of sedimentation and 
those that are suppressed by them and that strive to contest them. Given these points, the 
significance of the contesting potential of the impromptu bodily moves, embodying struggle, 
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resistance and mobilisation of qualitative properties of the public, resides in striating the 
smooth space of ‘pure immanence’, opening up the space for a plurality of viewpoints. By 
definition, the striated space is a space of (un)decidability; it enables the coexistence of 
paradoxically different systems of relations rather than silencing different choices through 
antagonistic acts.  
 
As is immediately apparent in the choreographic work of Zaides, the contesting dimension of 
dance is manifested through the resistance of the performer’s bodies to obey the prescribed set 
of rules which sediment neoliberal politics through the reiteration of determined movements in 
choreography. Simultaneously, the contesting dimension of dance is manifested throughout the 
struggle of the performer’s bodies for the recognition of moves that embody ethical, political 
and cultural values different than those values sustained by hegemonic politics and social 
practices of liberalism. The counter-hegemonic actions of resisting and struggling bodies 
choreographed in dance performances, then, bring to the fore the fact that the moment of 
exclusion is inherent to society and that every limit to objectivity, including dance 
performances, are antagonistic limits. Antagonism, as it was claimed, evokes the ever-present 
possibility of conflict between complying and contesting forces. While complying forces have 
a tendency to fix bodies by means of conceptualisation in the smooth space opened by the 
politics of harmony and absolute immanence and thus do away with conflicts and alterity, the 
contesting forces, which are mobilised by impromptu bodily acts, aim to weaken them and to 
open up a discussion about the ways society may be constructed in plural terms, along striated 
and conflictual lines.38 It is by disarticulating antagonistic relations between ‘the determined 
system of differential corporeal movements’ and ‘the rage of excluded impromptu physical 
moves’—transforming them into agonistic and plural configurations—that dance ultimately 
invigorates democracy.  
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This is why the political project of agonistic democracy, in the manner developed by Chantal 
Mouffe, is such an asset for dance theory. It enables a recognition of counter-hegemonic or 
contesting practices in dance performances and allows us to envisage dance in many different 
ways; not only within the framework of the theory of immanence—in terms of actualisation of 
the multiplicity of abstract concepts through bodily movement, but also within the framework 
of the theory of quasitranscendence—concerning the articulatory practice which embodies 
struggle between various discourses and representations. Such contesting dance practices may 
open up the space for what Mouffe, in her observation of Marcelo Evelin’s choreography, 
names an agonistic encounter of performers and the public; an agonistic encounter of separate 
entities located in the same space.39 The agonistic encounter also underlies the relationship 
between the performers in Daniel Linehan’s choreography dbddbb (2015) which—according 
to Linehan—explores both group solidarity and individual autonomy within the same 
choreographic space.40 Taking as its starting point protest movements and marches, Linehan 
achieves this goal by bringing a diversity of bodily forms together under the steady beat of 
‘wordless speech’.41 Furthermore, ways in which dance may construct communities and the 
‘identity’ of the people also concern the way choreographies challenge and articulate various 
everyday objects that are shared among people and that shape our relationships. For example, 
in the performance Black (2011), the choreographer, Mette Edvardsen, appears solo on an 
empty stage. She conjures objects into appearance by calling and repeating their names (table, 
chair, glass, water) and by mimicking their presence through bodily movements (sitting, 
drinking). Edvardsen explains that, by this choreographic tactic, she wanted to explore how 
reality exists in language and how language extends reality into space.42 Her goal is to 
challenge the reality of objects around us, by disarticulating existing meanings of objects and 
articulating new ones by mobilising the public’s qualitative properties—intelligence and 
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imagination. These radical or agonistic choreographic practices produce a form of agonistic 
objectification. Agonistic objectification in dance stands for the contingent character of bodily 
articulations which stabilise a specific configuration of movements in choreography at the 
given moment. It is discursively constructed as a partial and contesting system of relations that 
may always be articulated otherwise. 
 
With regard to agonistic encounters and agonistic objectifications, the contesting dance 
practices can be seen as choreo-political performances that challenge the ways in which reality, 
nature, objects and practices are assembled. By recognising that antagonism is constitutive of 
any social construction, contesting dance practices propose alternative ways of envisaging the 
systems of living together: the ways we encounter the world and the ways we objectify it. They 
open up the space for the agonistic debate around social, political and cultural themes that 
structure different identities, social practices, representations, and institutions. Without 
debate—that is to say, without the acknowledgement of antagonism—there is no political 
dimension in performance or in art more generally. It is only by embracing the dimension of 
antagonism, I would suggest, that a counterhegemonic and contesting politics can emerge 
within choreographic practices—transforming dance into a practice capable of challenging 
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